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Abstract
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective
over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones,
and can influence one another’s voting decision before the vote takes place. We
analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under
what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the pre-vote
phase.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory, and voting theory in particular, have been gaining increased at-
tention in the multiagent systems (MAS) literature in the last decade, and voting is
considered a fundamental tool for the study of MAS [1].
In the face of the extreme popularity of the voting paradigm, the MAS litera-
ture studying voting as a fully-fledged form of strategic interaction, i.e., as a non-
cooperative game, is very small (although growing, e.g., [2, 3, 4]). In particular, no
work with the notable exception of the literature on iterative voting [5, 6, 7] has studied
how voting behavior in rational agents is influenced by strategic forms of interaction
that precede the voting stage. Literature in social choice has recognised that interaction
preceding voting can be an effective tool to induce opinion change and achieve com-
promise solutions [8, 9] while in game theory pre-play negotiations are known to be
effective in overcoming inefficient allocations caused by players’ individual rationality
[10]. When players are allowed to offer a part of their gains at certain outcomes to
influence the decisions of the other agents, they are able to overcome highly inefficient
scenarios, such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma [10].
In this paper we study pre-vote negotiations in voting games over binary (yes/no)
issues, where voters hold a special type of lexicographic preferences over the set of
issues at stake, i.e., hold an objective about a subset of them while they are willing
to negotiate on the remaining ones, and can influence one another before casting their
ballots by transferring utility in order to obtain a more favourable outcome. We show
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that this type of pre-vote interaction has beneficial effects on voting games by refining
their set of equilibria.
Related work Our approach relates directly to several on-going lines of research in
social choice, game theory and their applications to MAS.
Binary Aggregation and Voting Games. We study societies of voters that express
a yes/no opinion on issues at stake. The setting is also known as voting in multiple
referenda and closely related to the growing literature on voting games. Classical ref-
erences include the work of Dhillon and Lockwood [11] and Messner and Polborn [12],
and more recently lead to computational studies of best-response dynamics in voting
games [5, 3, 6]. In binary voting, aside from the (non-)manipulability of voting rules
(see, for instance, [13]), non-cooperative game-theoretic aspects are underexplored and
are our focus here. Binary voting can be further enriched by imposing that individual
opinions also need to satisfy a set of integrity constraints, like in binary voting with
constraints [14] and judgment aggregation [15, 16]. Standard preference aggregation,
which is the classical framework for voting theory, is a special case of binary voting
with constraints [15]. Voting with constraints will be touched upon towards the end of
the paper.
Boolean games. We model voting strategies in binary aggregation as boolean
games [17, 18], allowing voters to have control of a set of propositional variables, i.e.,
their ballot, and to assign utilities to outcomes, with specific goal outcomes they want
to achieve. In our setting however goals of individuals are expressed on the outcome of
the decision process, thus on outcomes that do not depend on their single choice only.
Unlike boolean games, where each actor uniquely controls a propositional variable, in
our setting the control of a variable is shared among the voters and its final truth value
is determined by a voting rule.
Election control. The field of computational social choice has extensively studied
lobbying [19, 20] and bribery [21, 22], modelled from the single agent perspective of a
lobbyist or briber who tries to influence voters’ decisions through monetary incentives,
or from the perspective of a coalition of colluders [23]. Here we study forms of control
from a non-cooperative game-theoretic perspective where any voter can influence any
other voter.
Equilibrium refinement. Non-cooperative models of voting are known to suffer
from a multiplicity of equilibria, many of which appear counterintuitive. Equilibrium
selection or refinement is a vast and long-standing research program in game theory
[24]. Models of equilibrium refinement have been applied to voting games in the lit-
erature on economics [25, 26] and within MAS [2, 4], as well as the above mentioned
iterative voting model, which offers a natural strategy for selecting equilibria through
best response dynamics from the profile of truthful votes. In this paper we study a two-
phase model for equilibrium refinement in a voting game where equilibria are selected
by means of an initial pre-vote negotiation phase.
Pre-play negotiations. We model negotiations as a pre-play interaction phase, in
the spirit of Jackson and Wilkie [10]. During this phase, which precedes the play of a
normal form game, players are entitled to sacrifice a part of their final utility in order to
convince their opponents to play certain strategies, which in our case consist of voting
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ballots. In doing so we build upon and simplify the framework of endogenous boolean
games [27], which enriches boolean games with a pre-play phase.
Paper contribution and outline We describe a model of equilibrium refinement for
voting games which: (i) is applicable to one-shot voting in the general context of binary
aggregation; (ii) does not rely on limit behavior in repeated interactions; and (iii) can
capture the compromise-seeking phase that typically precedes decision-making by vot-
ing. More specifically we address the effect of pre-play negotiations on the outcomes
of voting games on binary (yes-no) issues. We isolate precise conditions under which
bad equilibria – e.g., inefficient ones – can be overcome, and good ones sustained.
The paper is organised as follows. First, in Section 2 we present the setting of bi-
nary aggregation, defining the (issue-wise) majority rule and a more general class of
aggregation procedures, which constitute the rules of choice for the current paper. Sec-
ond, we define voting games for binary aggregation, specifying individual preferences
by means of both a goal and a utility function, and we show how undesirable equilibria
can be removed by appropriate modifications of the game matrix (Section 3). Third,
we present a full-blown model of collective decisions as a two-phase game, with a
negotiation phase preceding the vote. We show how the set of equilibria can be re-
fined by means of rational negotiations removing undesirable equilibria and, dually,
maintaining desirable ones (Section 4). Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We model situations of collective decision-making in the framework of binary aggre-
gation. In this setting a finite set of agents express yes/no opinions on a finite set of
binary issues, and these opinions are then aggregated into a collective decision over
each issue.
Definition 1 (BA structure). A binary aggregation structure (BA structure) is a tuple
S = 〈N , I〉 where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set individuals s.t. |N | is odd1 and ≥ 3;
• I = {1, . . . ,m} is a finite set of issues.
We denote D = {B | B : I → {0, 1}} the set of all possible binary opinions over
the set of issues I and call an element B ∈ D a ballot. Thus, B(j) = 0 (respectively,
B(j) = 1) indicates that the agent who submits ballot B rejects (respectively, accepts)
the issue j.
A profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) is the choice of a ballot for every individual in N .
We write Bi to denote the ballot of individual i within a profile B. Thus, Bi(j) = 1
indicates that individual i accepts issue j in profile B. Furthermore we denote by
NBj = {i ∈ N | Bi(j) = 1} the set of individuals accepting issue j in profile B.
1The assumption guarantees that the majority rule we are going to introduce below is unbiased between
accepting or rejecting issues (cf. [16, Ch. 2]). It could be dropped at the expense of adding some further
technicalities to the framework.
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Definition 2 (Aggregation rule). Given a BA structure S, an aggregation rule (or ag-
gregator) for S is a function F : DN → D, mapping every profile to a binary ballot
in D. F (B)(j) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on issue j.
Possibly the best-known aggregation rule is issue-by-issue strict majority rule (maj ),
which accepts an issue if and only if the majority of voters accept it, formallymaj (B)(j) =
1 if and only if |NBj | ≥
|N |+1
2
. Other notable examples of aggregation rules include
quota rules, which accept an issue if the number of voters accepting it exceeds a pos-
sibly different quota for each issue, and distance-based rules, which output the ballot
that minimises the overall distance to the profile for a suitable notion of distance.
Example 1. A parliament composed by equally representative parties A,B,C is to
decide whether to develop atomic weapons (W), importing nuclear technology from
the foreign market (F), and build in-house nuclear plants (P). The profile in Table 1
is an instance of binary aggregation with the majority rule, in which each individual
submits a binary opinion over each of the three issues at stake.
W F P
Party A 1 0 1
Party B 1 1 0
Party C 0 0 0
Majority 1 0 0
Table 1: An instance of binary aggregation
Given an aggregation rule F , we call a set of voters C ⊆ N a winning coalition
if for every profile B, issues j ∈ I and x ∈ {0, 1}, if C = {i ∈ N | Bi(j) = x}
then F (B)(j) = x. We call C a resilient winning coalition if C is a winning coali-
tion and C \ {i} is also a winning coalition for every i ∈ C.2 Given an aggregator
F , we denote with WF the set of winning coalitions for F , and with W+F the set
of resilient winning coalitions. In the case of the majority rule we have W+maj ={
C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ |N |+1
2
+ 1
}
, i.e., all coalitions exceeding the majority threshold of
at least one element are resilient.
Aggregation rules are classified by means of axioms that bind the properties of the
outcome at certain profiles. We refer the reader to the relevant literature for a formal
treatment of axiomatic properties. Here we provide just the following definitions in
terms of winning coalitions:
Definition 3 (Systematicity). An aggregatorF is called systematic if it can be charac-
terised through winning coalitions, i.e., if there exists a set WF ⊆ 2N such that for all
profiles B and issues j ∈ I, we have that F (B)(j) = 1 iff NBj ∈ WF .
Definition 4 (Monotonicity). A systematic rule F is called monotonic if its set of
winning coalitions is closed under supersets, i.e., for all C ∈ WF , if C ⊆ C′ then
C′ ∈ WF .
2Cf. the notion of k-resiliency in [28].
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The majority rule and all quota rules satisfy these axioms, but systematicity, for
instance, is violated by most distance-based rules. In this paper we focus on systematic
and monotonic rules, as a strict generalisation of the majority rule.
3 Aggregation Games
In this section we present the model of a strategic game played by voters involved in
a collective decision-making problem on binary issues. The players’ strategies consist
of all binary ballots and players’ preferences are expressed in the form of a goal that is
interpreted on the outcomes of the aggregation (i.e., the collective decision), and by an
explicit payoff function for each player i, yielding to i a real number at each profile and
encoding, intuitively, the material value he would receive, should that profile of votes
occur. Given a set of issues I, let PS = {p1, . . . , pm} contain one propositional atom
for each issue in I and LPS be the propositional language constructed by closing PS
under a functionally complete set of Boolean connectives (e.g., {¬,∧}).
Definition 5 (Aggregation games). An aggregation game is a tupleA = 〈N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N
〉
where:
• 〈N , I〉 is a binary aggregation structure;
• F is an aggregation rule for 〈N , I〉;
• each γi is a cube, i.e. a conjunction of literals from LPS;3
• πi : DN → R is a payoff function assigning to each profile a real number
denoting the utility of player i.
A strategy profile in an aggregation game is a profile of binary ballots, and will be
denoted with B. Intuitively, goals represent positions that players are not willing to
sacrifice. By making the assumptions that goals are cubes we assume that each voter
has a simple incentive structure, and can identify a certain set of atoms that she would
like to be positive, another set of atoms that she would like to be negative, and that
she is indifferent to all others. When comparing two states, one of which satisfying his
goal and one of which not satisfying it, a player will choose the state satisfying his goal.
In case of indifference with respect to goals, players will look at the value yielded by
the payoff function. This is technically called a quasi-dichotomous preference relation
[18]. Henceforth we employ the satisfaction relation |= (respectively, its negation 6|=)
to express that a ballot satisfies (respectively, does not satisfy) a goal.
Definition 6. Let A =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N
〉
be an aggregation game, B,B′
be two ballot profiles and i ∈ N a player. The preference relation pii for each i ∈ N
is such that B pii B
′ iff:
• [F (B′) 6|= γi and F (B) |= γi] or
• [F (B′) |= γi ⇔ F (B) |= γi] and πi(B) ≥ π′i(B).
3Formally, each γi is equivalent to
∧
j∈K ℓj where K ⊆ I and ℓj = pj or ℓj = ¬pj for all j ∈ K .
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In other words, a profile B is preferred by player i to B′ if either F (B) satisfies i’s
goal and F (B′) does not or, if both satisfy i’s goal or neither do, B yields to i a better
payoff than B′. Individual preferences over strategy profiles are therefore induced by
their goals, by their payoff functions, and by the aggregation procedure used.
A natural class of aggregation games is that of games where the individual utility
only depends on the outcome of the collective decision:
Definition 7. An aggregation game A is called uniform if for all i ∈ N and profiles
B it is the case that πi(B) = πi(B′) whenever F (B) = F (B′). It is called constant,
if all πi are constant functions, i.e., for all i ∈ N and all profiles B we have that
πi(B) = πi(B
′).
Clearly, all constant aggregation games are uniform. Games with uniform payoff are
arguably the most natural examples of aggregation games. The payoff each player
receives is only dependent on the outcome of the vote, and not on the ballot profile that
determines it. For convenience, we assume that in uniform games the payoff function
is defined directly on outcomes, i.e., πi : D → R.
Adapting a standard definition from the literature, we call a strategy B i-truthful if
it satisfies γi. In case γi is a complete cube that specifies fully a single binary ballot,
i.e., the agent has one precise objective over all issues at stake, we fall into the classic
setting of having a unique truthful strategy and all other ballots available for strategic
voting.
Definition 8. Let C ⊆ N . We call a strategy profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn):
(i) C-truthful if all Bi with i ∈ C are i-truthful, i.e., Bi |= γi, for all i ∈ C;
(ii) C-goal-efficient (C-efficient) if F (B) |= ∧i∈C γi;
(iii) totally C-goal-inefficient (totally C-inefficient) if F (B) |= ∧i∈C ¬γi.
One last piece of notation: let us call a game C-consistent, for C ⊆ N , if the conjunc-
tion of the goals of agents in coalition C is consistent, i.e., if
∧
i∈C γi is satisfiable.
3.1 Equilibria in Uniform Aggregation Games
In this section we explore the existence of Nash equilibria (NE) in aggregation games
and their properties, paying special attention to NE that are truthful and efficient. We
omit the easier proofs in the interest of space.
We start with the following result. Recall that a strategy Bi is weakly dominant for
agent i if for all profiles B we have that (B−i, Bi) pii B.
Proposition 1. If A is a constant aggregation game for the majority rule, then for
every i ∈ N every i-truthful strategy is weakly dominant.
Proof. Let B∗i be i-truthful and let B′i be any non-truthful strategy for i. We show
that for each profile B−i we have that (B−i, B∗i ) pii (B−i, B′i). Since payoffs are
constant by assumption, we can reason by case distinction as follows. There are four
cases. Both maj (B−i, B∗i ) and maj (B−i, B′i) satisfy γi (1) or do not satisfy it (2).
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In both these cases B∗i weakly dominates B′i. If (3) maj (B−i, B∗i ) satisfies γi and
maj (B−i, B
′
i) does not, then B∗i strictly dominates B′i. Finally, (4) maj (B−i, B∗i )
does not satisfy γi but maj (B−i, B′i) does. Since γi =
∧
j∈X ℓj , then there exists a
k ∈ X such that maj (B−i, B∗i ) 6|= ℓk but maj (B−i, B′i) |= ℓk. Assume wlog that ℓk
is positive, i.e., ℓk = pk. Since B∗i is assumed to be truthful, we know that B∗i |= ℓk
which in turns implies that B∗i (k) = 1. By the systematicity of the majority rule we
know that the acceptance of issue k in profile B depends solely on the acceptance of
issue k by i. Combining our assumption that maj (B−i, B′i)(k) = 1 with the mono-
tonicity of the majority rule, we can infer that also maj (B−i, B∗i )(k) = 1, against our
assumption that this last profile does not satisfy ℓk.
It follows that every constant aggregation game has a NE.
Remark 2 (Generalisation). Proposition 1 can be generalised to all aggregation rules
that are systematic and monotonic, and therefore non-manipulable in social-choice-
theoretic sense [13].
The following example shows that Proposition 1 ceases to hold if we allow the
goals of the voters to be propositional formulas more complex than a cube:
Example 2. Let there be three voters, and let agent 1’s goal be that of having an
odd number of accepted issues, while agents 2 and 3 have no specific goals. Let
B2 = (1, 0, 0) and B3 = (0, 1, 0). The 1-truthful ballot B1 = (0, 0, 1) results un-
der the majority rule in (0, 0, 0), and is hence dominated by ballot (1, 0, 1) which is
non-truthful but results in (1, 0, 0). This last outcome has has an odd number of ac-
cepted issues and hence satisfies 1’s goal.
We now observe that Proposition 1 does not generalise to uniform aggregation
games, i.e., games where the utility of players depends solely on the outcome of the
aggregation:
Proposition 3. There exist uniform aggregation games formaj in which truthful strate-
gies are not dominant.
Proof. Consider the set of issues {p, q, t} and a setN = {1, 2, 3}. Let γ1 = ¬p∧q∧¬t,
γ2 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬t, and γ3 = ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ t. Define the payoff function as follows,
let πi(B) = 1 for i = 3 and B = (0, 1, 0), and 0 otherwise. Take the following
profiles: B1 = ((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)) and B2 = ((0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)).
Since maj (B1) = (0, 0, 0) and maj (B2) = (0, 1, 0), we have B2 ≻pi3 B1 and B1,
unlike B2, comprises a truthful strategy by 3.
The fact that truthful voting is not always a dominant strategy for aggregation
games with sigle-model goals might seem counterintuitive, especially when the payoff
is required to be uniform across profiles leading to the same outcome. It is however
sufficient to recall that when a player is in the position of changing the outcome of the
decision in a certain profile this does not necessarily mean he has the power to satisfy
his goal, but he might simply choose the outcome he prefers because of the payoff.
Despite the negative result in Proposition 3, we can still prove the existence of
truthful and efficient equilibria in a uniform aggregation game if we assume the mutual
consistency of the individual goals of a resilient winning coalition.
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Proposition 4. Let F be a systematic and monotonic aggregator, and let C ∈ W+F .
Every C-consistent uniform aggregation game for F has a NE that is C-truthful and
C-efficient.
Proof. Take a C-consistent game. Then there exists a ballot B∗ such that B∗ |=∧
i∈C γi. Take now any ballot profile B
∗ such that B∗ is the ballot of all and only
the voters in C while all agents in N\C vote the inverse ballot B∗ (that is, for any
issue j, B∗(j) = 1 iff B∗(j) = 0). Since C ∈ WF (by the assumption that C ∈ W+F )
we have that F (B∗) = B∗. Clearly F (B∗) satisfies
∧
i γi, and each individual in C
votes truthfully. We show that B∗ is a Nash equilibrium, by showing that (a) no agent
in N\C has a profitable deviation, and (b) no agent in C has a profitable deviation. As
to (a), since F is monotonic, any change in the ballot B∗(j) by some voter in N\C
does not change the outcome F (B∗) = B∗. As to (b), any change in the ballot B∗ by
some voter in C does not change the outcome because C ∈ W+F . This completes the
proof.
On the other hand, undesirable equilibria may occur even when all agents have
compatible goals.
Proposition 5. There exist N -consistent aggregation games for maj with NE that are
N -truthful and totally N -inefficient.
Proof. Let A be an aggregation game for maj such that γi = pi, and let B∗ be the
profile illustrated in Table 2. Let all payoff functions πi be constant. We can observe
that B∗ is a truthful profile, and therefore it is a NE by Proposition 1 and by the fact
that the game is constant. However, the outcome of the majority rule in B∗ is totally
inefficient, since none of the individual goals are satisfied.
W F P
Party A 1 0 0
Party B 0 1 0
Party C 0 0 1
Majority 0 0 0
Table 2: Inefficient equilibria
The goal of Section 4 is to show how to avoid such undesirable equilibria by al-
lowing a pre-vote negotiation phase. We anticipate this by showing the effect of payoff
redistributions on the equilibria of the aggregation game.
3.2 Goal-inefficiency and payoff transformations
We show that goal-inefficiency at equilibrium in uniform aggregation games can be
ruled out by means of a redistribution of payoff among the members of a winning
coalition. This result is the stepping stone for the framework of Section 4.
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Proposition 6. Let A =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N
〉
be a C-consistent uniform ag-
gregation game for a systematic and monotonic procedure F , where C is a winning
coalition for F . Then, there exist payoff functions {π′i}i∈C such that
∑
i∈C π
′
i(B) =∑
i∈C πi(B) for every profileB, and such that the gameA =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {π
′
i}i∈C ∪ {πi}i6∈C
〉
has no C-inefficient NE.
Proof. Let B∗ be a ballot such that B∗ |= ∧i∈C γi. We now construct a redistribution
of payoffs in which player 1 ∈ C gives all other players in C an incentive to play B∗,
turning it into a weakly dominant strategy. LetM−1 be the maximal payoff difference
that some player can obtain between two outcomes in the game 〈A, {πi}i∈N 〉. The
desired payoff functions are constructed as follows. For all j 6= 1 such that j ∈
C define π′j(B) = πj(B) + M for all profiles B with Bj = B∗, and π′j(B) =
πj(B) otherwise. Let finally π′1(B) = π1(B)−(
∑
16=k∈C π
′
k(B)−
∑
16=k∈C πk(B)).
Observe that the construction of π′ ensures that
∑
i∈C π
′
i(B) =
∑
i∈C πi(B), for
every profile B. Now let B be a C-inefficient profile of the new game and assume
towards a contradiction that it is a NE. Take an arbitrary player j ∈ C such that Bj 6=
B∗. Such a player exists since, by monotonicity of F , if Bi = B∗ for all i ∈ C
then profile B is not C-inefficient. By construction of π′j and the fact that C is a
winning coalition, player j ∈ C has an incentive to deviate to B∗, hence B is not a
NE. Contradiction.
In other words, given a uniform game, payoff functions always exist that can eliminate
any NE which is goal-inefficient for a winning coalition, while keeping the sum of
players’ payoffs constant in the coalition. The new payoff function – which, note, is
not necessarily uniform any more – can be thought of as a binding offer of payoff that
a player makes to the others, incentivising them to deviate to an outcome which is
goal-efficient for the coalition.
4 Endogenous Aggregation Games
The games we are going to study have two phases:
• A pre-vote phase, where, starting from a uniform aggregation game, players
make simultaneous transfers of payoff to their fellow players;
• A vote phase, where players play the original aggregation game, but where pay-
offs are updated according to the transfers occurred in the pre-vote phase.
We call these games endogenous aggregation games. The key concept to define them
is the one of transfer function τi : DN × N → R+ (with i ∈ N ). These functions
encode the amount of payoff that a player i gives to player j should a certain profile of
votes B be played, in symbols, τi(B, j). We call τ ∈
∏
i Ti a transfer profile, denoting
by τ0 the void transfer where at every profile every player gives 0 to the others. So by
τ(A) =
〈
N , I, F, {γi}i∈N , {π
′
i}i∈N
〉
we denote the aggregation game with payoff
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obtained from A where π′i is updated according to the transfer profile τ as follows:
π′i(B) = πi(B) +
∑
j∈N
τj(B, i)−
∑
j∈N
τi(B, j) (1)
It is important to notice that transfers do not preserve the uniformity of payoffs. We
define now endogenous aggregation games formally as follows:
Definition 9. An endogenous aggregation game is a tuple AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 where
A is a uniform aggregation game, and each Ti is the set of all functions τi : DN×N →
R+.
Endogenous aggregation games will be analysed as extensive form games with per-
fect information and simultaneous choices. There are two phases in the overall game
and therefore two choice points: in the first one a transfer profile is determined; in the
second one a ballot profile is determined. So strategies of player i consist of sequen-
tial choices of a transfer τi and a ballot Bi. Preference relations are naturally defined
between tuples of the form (τ,B): for two profiles of ballots B,B′, the expression
(τ,B) i (τ ′,B
′) denotes that player i prefers B after τ has been played in the pre-
vote phase, to B′ after τ ′ has been played in the pre-vote phase. Equilibrium analysis
will be carried out using the solution concept of reference for extensive games: sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE). To avoid complicating the framework with the
introduction of mixed strategies over lexicographic preferences – which bears notori-
ous difficulties in terms of game-theoretic analysis [29] – and to keep the focus on pure
strategy equilibria, we make the following assumption: (♠) for any game τ(A) with
some pure strategy NE and any player i ∈ N , a deviation by i to a game (τ ′i , τ−i)(A′)
with no pure strategy NE is never profitable for i.
Definition 10. Given an endogenous aggregation game 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉, we call a NE B
of the aggregation gameA a surviving Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there exists a transfer
profile τ and a SPE of AT where (τ,B) is played on the equilibrium path.
SPEs can be constructed through backward induction: first, a NE is selected (when-
ever it exists) after each transfer profile; second, a transfer profile is selected, such that
no profitable deviation exists for any player by changing her individual transfer func-
tion. Intuitively, surviving Nash equilibria identify those electoral outcomes that can
be rationally sustained by an appropriate pre-vote negotiation. Clearly, not all Nash
equilibria of the initial game will be surviving equilibria. In what follows we show that
surviving equilibria display desirable properties, and pre-play negotiations can effec-
tively act as equilibrium refinement tools for aggregation games.
4.1 Equilibria in Endogenous Aggregation Games
Pre-vote negotiations can be shown to yield desirable effects in terms of goal-efficiency,
as shown in the following:
Theorem 7. Let AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N〉 be a N -consistent endogenous aggregation
game for a systematic and monotonic aggregator F . Then, every N -efficient NE of
〈A, {πi}i∈N 〉 is a surviving NE.
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Proof. Let B be a N -efficient NE of A. We want to find a transfer function τ∗ such
that (τ∗,B) is a SPE ofAT . Let M−1 be the maximal payoff difference between out-
comes as defined in the proof of Proposition 6. For all i, j ∈ N , let τ∗i (B
′, j) = 2M
if B′i 6= Bi, and τ∗i (B
′, j) = 0 otherwise. In words, each player i is committing
to play the ballot Bi by offering the others 2M in case of deviation. Now we show
that (τ∗,B) is a SPE.4 First, notice that, since the game is N -consistent and the goals
are cubes (Definition 5), by Proposition 1 (which applies because the assumptions of
monotonicity and systematicity for F ) and the construction of τ , B is a unique domi-
nant strategy equilibrium. Now consider the strategy profile (τ∗,B) of AT . We now
show that a deviation to some τ ′′i∗ by a player i∗ is not profitable for i∗. Observe that
such a deviation can only be improving for i∗ if it also leads some other player j to
play something other than Bj . If only i∗ deviates, then i∗ cannot do better given that
B is a NE by assumption and τ∗i∗(B
′, j) = 0 when B′i = Bi. So suppose a NE B
′′
is played in the second stage where B′′j 6= Bj for some j 6= i∗. If no Nash equilibria
exist in the second stage, then by assumption (♠) a deviation from τ∗ is not profitable.
Let there be k ≥ 1 players j 6= i∗ for which B′′j 6= Bj and consider some such j. By
playing B′′j player j’s payoff is:
πj(B
′′)− (|N | − 1)2M + 2M(k + 1) + τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j).
If j plays Bj instead, then j’s payoff is:
πj(Bj ,B
′′
−j) + 2M(k + 1) + τ
′′
i∗(Bj ,B
′′
−j , j).
As B′′ is a NE, it follows that:
τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j)− τ ′′i∗(Bj ,B
′′
−j , j) ≥ πj(Bj ,B
′′
−j)
− πj(B
′′) + (|N | − 1)2M.
Given the definition ofM and given the fact that |N |−1 ≥ 2 it follows that τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j)−
τ ′′i∗(Bj ,B
′′
−j , j) > 3M , which implies that τ ′′i∗(B
′′, j) > 3M . Therefore i∗’s utility in
the new equilibrium is at most πi∗(B′′) − k3M + k2M . The fact that k ≥ 1 implies
that πi∗(B′′)− k3M + k2M ≤ πi∗(B). Since B is N -efficient, then the constructed
deviation τ ′′ cannot be profitable.
The converse of Theorem 7 holds true, and it generalises to winning coalitions with
internally consistent goals:
Theorem 8. Let AT = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N 〉 be an endogenous aggregation game for a sys-
tematic and monotonic aggregator F such that A is C-consistent for C ∈ WF . Then,
every surviving NE of AT is C-efficient.
Proof. We proceed by contraposition. Let B∗ be a NE that is not C-efficient, i.e., such
that F (B∗) 6|= γi for some individual i ∈ C, and assume towards a contradiction that
B
∗ is a SNE. Therefore there exists a transfer function τ∗ and a SPE of AT such that
4Our argument generalises the argument for pre-play negotiations with more than two players given in
the proof of Jackson and Wilkie’s [[10], Theorem 4].
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(τ∗,B∗) is played on the equilibrium path. We now construct a profitable deviation
from τ∗, leading to contradiction. By C-consistency of A there exists a ballot B′
such that B′ |=
∧
j∈C γj , hence in particular B′ |= γi. Let now i deviate to any
transfer profile τ ′ = (τ ′i , τ∗−i) such that she offers more than the payoff difference to all
other players if they vote for ballot B′, i.e., τ ′i(B′j ,B
′′
−j , j)− τ
∗
i (B
′′, j) > πj(B
′′)−
πj(B
′
j ,B
′′
−j), for each j ∈ N , and each B′′−j . By the fact that B′ is C-efficient,
F systematic and monotonic, and C is a winning coalition, this transfer makes each
B′j , with j ∈ N \ {i}, (uniquely) survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. All NE after playing τ ′ will now satisfy γi, making τ ′ a profitable deviation.
Observe that Theorem 8 implies the existence of endogenous aggregation games
where no equilibria is surviving. This is the case when distinct but overlapping coali-
tions have incompatible goals, as the following example shows:
Example 3. Let there be five players in N , and let F be the majority rule. Let γ1 =
p∧¬r, γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = ⊤ and let γ5 = r ∧¬p. Both coalitions C1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
C2 = {2, 3, 4, 5} are resilient winning coalitions, and the game is both C1 consistent
and C2 consistent. Hence, by Theorem 8 any surviving equilibria must be both C1-
efficient and C2 efficient, which is impossible given that the goals of the two coalitions
are mutually incompatible.
What happens in situations similar to the one presented in Example 3 is that both
player 1 and player 5 will offer ever increasing amount of utility to the remaining three
players, in order to attain their goals. A deeper analysis of the coalitional structure
induced by the goals, as well as a generalisation of the setting to budgeted goals may
suggest solutions to the problems highlighted in the previous example.
Results such as Theorems 7 and 8 suggest that pre-vote negotiations are a powerful
tool players have to overcome the inefficiencies of aggregation rules. More specifically,
when the goals of all players can be satisfied at the same time, pre-vote negotiations
allow players to engineer side-payments leading to equilibrium outcomes that satisfy
them, ruling out all the others. We stress that players’ equilibrium strategies in the
two phase game remain individually rational strategies and the game remains non-
cooperative throughout – and hence radically different from approaches like [23] –
even when equilibrium strategies end up sustaining efficiency.
Remark 9 (Algorithms). An algorithm to compute a pre-vote negotiation strategy that
leads to a sustainable NE is provided in the proof of Theorems 7. The assumption of
perfect information is crucial here, and can be considered as an approximation of a
real-world situation in which the goals and payoffs of the agents can be assessed by
means, e.g., of a poll.
4.2 Pre-vote negotiations and voting paradoxes
We show an application of endogenous aggregation games to binary aggregation with
constraints, or judgment aggregation [14, 16], where individual ballots need to satisfy
a logical formula, the integrity constraint, to be considered admissible. In case each
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individual provides an admissible ballot, the obvious question is whether the outcome
of a given aggregation rule will be admissible, as well. Here is an instance of this
problem.
Example 4. Consider the scenario in Table 1. In line with the intuitions behind the
example, we stipulate that accepting W while at the same time rejecting both F and
P is not an admissible opinion: if one wants to develop atomic weapons one should
either import nuclear technology or develop it domestically. We can formulate this
requirement in a propositional language as W → (F ∨ P ), making ballot (1, 0, 0)
inadmissible. All submitted ballots in the example satisfy this requirement but the ma-
jority ballot does not (Table 1).
Paradoxical situations as those in Example 4 can be viewed as undesirable out-
comes of aggregation games. Assume to this purpose each party to have the following
goals: γ′A =W,γ′B = F, γ′C = ¬P . Let πA = πB = πC be constant payoff functions.
Observe that parties’ goals are all consistent with the integrity constraintW → (F∨P ),
and that admissible ballot (1,1,0) satisfies each of them. The profile in Table 1 shows a
truthful NE that however does not satisfy neither the goal of party B nor the integrity
constraint W → (F ∨ P ). However, this equilibrium is not surviving because party B
could transfer enough utility to party C for it to vote for F .
In consistent aggregation games equilibria that give rise to a voting paradox may not
survive, whereas equilibria avoiding such paradoxes are always sustained by a pre-vote
negotiation phase. But the key question is whether we can guarantee that inadmissible
equilibria do not survive.The following proposition shows a simple sufficient condition.
Let the integrity constraint be a formula IC, and call an individual i responsible if
γi |= IC, i.e., if i’s goal logically implies the constraint. The following holds:
Proposition 10. If A = 〈A, {Ti}i∈N〉 is an N -consistent endogenous aggregation
game such that there exists a responsible player, then every surviving equilibrium is
IC-consistent.
In particular, if all individual goals imply the integrity constraint, i.e., the goal of each
party includes an admissible decision, pre-vote negotiation will rule out all inadmissi-
ble equilibria and some admissible outcome is bound to survive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the effect of a pre-vote phase before an aggregation game for
binary voting, where voters might hold an objective about a subset of the issues at stake
while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones. A number of papers in the literature
on voting games have focused on the problem of avoiding undesirable equilibria (e.g.,
[2] and [4]). Our proposal has been to study an explicit pre-vote negotiation phase,
during which agents can influence one another before casting their ballots in order
to obtain an individually more favourable electoral outcome. By doing so, we have
shown how undesirable equilibria can be eliminated (dually, desirable ones sustained)
as an effect of a rational distributed negotiation phase, for a set of aggregators defined
axiomatically. We have also seen how these results have potential consequences in
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avoiding paradoxical situations of aggregation procedures, a core research problem in
judgment aggregation [16].
Future work include the study of aggregation games for different voting procedures,
e.g., distance-based ones, that do not satisfy the axiom of systematicity. A second
important line of work is the study of budgeted transfer functions, in which agents
are endowed with limited resources to be used in the negotiation phase. Finally, as
observed in Remark 9, a treatment of imperfect information is naturally called for.
Acknowledgments
Paolo Turrini acknowledges support from the Marie Curie fellowship “NINA” (FP7-
PEOPLE-2012-IEF, 327424). The authors are greatly indebted to Edith Elkind for her
feedback on an earlier version of the paper.
References
[1] F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiss,
editor, Multiagent Systems, pages 213–283. MIT Press, 2014.
[2] Y. Desmedt and E. Elkind. Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. In
Proc. of EC-2010, 2010.
[3] Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Stackelberg voting games: Computational as-
pects and paradoxes. In Proc. of AAAI-2010, 2010.
[4] Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, and David R. M. Thompson. Plurality
voting with truth-biased agents. In Proc. of SAGT-2013, 2013.
[5] Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, and Nicholas R. Jennings.
Convergence to equilibria in plurality voting. In Proc. of the 24th conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2010), 2010.
[6] Omer Lev and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Convergence of iterative voting. In Proc. of
the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS-2012), 2012.
[7] S. Braˆnzei, I. Caragiannis, J. Morgenstern, and A. Procaccia. How bad is selfish
voting? In Proc. of the 27th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-13),
2013.
[8] J. Dryzek and C. List. Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: A rec-
onciliation. British Journal of Political Science, 33:1–28, 2003.
[9] C. List. Group communication and the transformation of judgments: An impos-
sibility result. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 19(1):1–27, 2011.
14
[10] Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie. Endogenous games and mechanisms:
Side payments among players. Review of Economic Studies, 72(2):543–566,
2005.
[11] Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood. When are plurality rule voting games
dominance-solvable? Games and Economic Behavior, 46(1):55 – 75, 2004.
[12] Matthias Messner and Mattias Polborn. Strong and coalition-proof political equi-
libria under plurality and runoff rule. International Journal of Game Theory,
35(2):287–314, 2007.
[13] F. Dietrich and C. List. Strategy-proof judgment aggregation. Economics and
Philosophy, 23(3):269–300, 2007.
[14] Umberto Grandi and Ulle Endriss. Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggre-
gation. Artificial Intelligence, 199-200:45–66, 2013.
[15] F. Dietrich and C. List. Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation. Social Choice
and Welfare, 29(19–33), 2007.
[16] Davide Grossi and Gabriella Pigozzi. Judgment Aggregation: A Primer. Synthe-
sis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Morgan & Claypool
Publishers, 2014.
[17] Paul Harrenstein, Wiebe van der Hoek, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, and Cees Wit-
teveen. Boolean games. In Proceeding TARK VIII, pages 287–298, 2001.
[18] M. Wooldridge, U. Endriss, S. Kraus, and J. Lang. Incentive engineering in
boolean games. Artificial Intelligence, 195:418–439, 2013.
[19] R. Christian, M. Fellows, F. Rosamond, and A. Slinko. On complexity of lobby-
ing in multiple referenda. Review of Economic Design, 11(3):217–224, 2007.
[20] R. Bredereck, J. Chen, S. Hartung, S. Kratsch, R. Niedermeier, O. Suchy´, and
G. J. Woeginger. A multivariate complexity analysis of lobbying in multiple ref-
erenda. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 50:409–446, 2014.
[21] D. Baumeister, G. Erde´lyi, O. Johanna Erde´lyi, and J. Rothe. Computational
aspects of manipulation and control in judgment aggregation. In Proc. of the Third
International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT-2013), 2013.
[22] Noam Hazon, Raz Lin, and Sarit Kraus. How to change a group’s collective deci-
sion? In Proc. of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI-2013), 2013.
[23] Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and P. Faliszewski. Coalitional voting manipulation. In
Proc. of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-
2011), 2011.
[24] R. B. Meyerson. Refinements of the nash equilibrium concept. International
Journal of Game Theory, 7(2):73–80, 1978.
15
[25] W. Gueth and R. Selten. Majority voting in the condorcet paradox as a problem
of equilibrium selection. In Game Equilibrium Models IV. 1991.
[26] Y. Kim. Equilibrium selection in n-person coordination games. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 15:203–227, 1996.
[27] P. Turrini. Endogenous boolean games. In Proc. of IJCAI-2013, 2013.
[28] J. Halpern. Beyond nash-equilibrium: Solution concepts for the 21st century. In
K. Apt and E. Gra¨del, editors, Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists,
pages 264–289. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[29] Ariel Rubinstein. Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent.
Princeton University Press, 2012.
16
